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BLONDIN V. DUBOIS: A CLOSER STEP TO
SAFEGUARDING THE WELFARE OF
ABDUCTED CHILDREN?
I. INTRODUCTION
Occasionally, family disputes escalate to the point where
one parent feels the best way to protect the children is to ab-
duct them from the family residence. This situation is further
complicated when the children are abducted to another coun-
try. The volume and frequency of international child abduc-
tions can be attributed to a variety of sociological factors in-
cluding improvements in international transportation, greater
freedom across borders, an increase in marriages between
persons from different countries, and a general liberalization of
access to divorce.1 To effectuate the return of one's child to the
country from which they were abducted, parents often rely on
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction.2
Although the Hague Convention was drafted with the
specific intent of effectuating the prompt return of children to
the states from which they were wrongfully removed,3 it pro-
vides some defenses4 which, if interpreted too liberally, could
frustrate the ultimate goals of the Convention. One of these
exceptions, in Article 13(b), provides that if returning the ab-
ducted child would place that child at "grave risk" of harm or
put the child in an otherwise "intolerable situation" the court
in the country to which the child has been abducted can deny
1. See, PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION
ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 262 (1999). While the summary return of a
child to a situation that may be harmful is disturbing, it has been made clear
that the Convention seeks to protect the interests of children collectively and that
the welfare of the individual child is not the first and paramour, consideration.
Id. at 29.
2. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
opened for signature, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 19 I.L.M. 1501 (1980)
Ihereinafter Hague Convention or Convention].
3. Id. at Preamble
4. See id. at arts. 13 and 20.
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the child's return.' In Blondin v. Dubois,' the Second Circuit
ruled that if a court decided that returning a child to the peti-
tioning parent would put the child at "grave risk," that court
must further examine other possible interim custody arrange-
ments the foreign country may be able to provide before deny-
ing the courts of that country the opportunity to decide the
ultimate custody issue. By demanding that courts in the Sec-
ond Circuit give additional consideration to the foreign
country's ability to protect the children from the "grave risk,"
this decision narrows the situations in which the "grave risk"
defense can be successfully argued and thus causes the return
of more children to the countries from which they were abduc-
ted.
In Blondin v. Dubois (hereinafter "Blondin P'), after the
mother abducted the children to New York from France in
order to escape the alleged abuse of the father, she sought to
prevent their return by claiming that such a return would pose
a "grave risk" to the children's safety.7 In Blondin I, the moth-
er attempted to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that there was a "grave risk" that returning the child to
France would expose them to physical or psychological harm or
otherwise place them in an intolerable situation.8 Although
recognizing that the "grave risk" exception is intended to be
narrowly construed, the district court followed the lead of the
Eighth Circuit and evaluated the circumstances that await the
children upon their return to their habitual residence.' The
mother was not in a financial situation to live independently in
France if her children were forced to return and therefore
indicated that she would be compelled to live with the
children's father.1 ° Taking this into consideration, and wary of
allowing the mother and children to return to the home of the
father, the district court ruled that "under circumstances, re-
quiring Dubois and the children to return to France for legal
proceedings would present a grave risk of psychological
harm."1 The district court did not take into consideration the
5. See id. at art. 13.
6. 189 F.3d 240 (2d. Cir. 1999) [hereinafter "Blondin IrFJ.
7. 19 F. Supp. 2d 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) [hereinafter "Blondin P].
8. Id. at 127.
9. Id. See also Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 1995).
10. Blondin I, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 128.
11. Id.
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possibility of France providing an alternative custody situation
for the children during the course of the custody proceedings.
In Blondin II,12 the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the
case."3 On appeal the Second Circuit concluded that "the
Hague Convention requires a more complete analysis of the
full panoply of arrangements that might allow the children to
be returned to the country from which they were wrongfully
abducted, in order to allow courts of that nation an opportunity
to adjudicate custody."' Courts in the Second Circuit must
now inquire into the existence of possible options in the child's
home country that will protect the child from a "grave risk" of
harm upon his or her return. 5 If a district court decides that
placing the children in the custody of the petitioning parent
would put them at a "grave risk" of harm, the court cannot
deny the return of the children to that country unless it can
cite legal authority for its determination that the possible
custody options presented by the foreign nation would also be
unacceptable. 6 Further, to aid in their decision making, the
district courts are now empowered to use their equitable dis-
cretion to develop a thorough record regarding the custody op-
tions of the foreign country.
On remand the district court applied the new clarified
standard adopted by the Court of Appeals. 8 The court devel-
oped a thorough record by examining the arrangements the
French government could provide for the children and hearing
testimony on how the children could handle these arrange-
ments psychologically. 9 The court determined that Blondin
seriously abused the children and that they would suffer se-
vere psychological harm from any return to France, no matter
how swift and thorough the actions of the French court sys-
12. 189 F.3d 242.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 249.
17. Id. In doing so the District Court should feel free to make any appropri-
ate or necessary inquiries of the government of France-especially regarding the
availability of ameliorative placement options.
18. Blondin v. Dubois, 78 F. Supp. 2d 283, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) [hereinafter
Blondin III].
19. Id. at 287, 288.
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tem.20 Thus, even after applying the new clarified standard
announced by the Court of Appeals, the district court held that
under these extreme circumstances a "grave risk" existed, and
thus it denied the father's petition for the children's return.21
The "grave risk" exception is the defense most likely to be
encountered in Hague Convention petitions.22 The issue of
whether a parent will be successful in using this defense in the
Second Circuit will now partially turn on the foreign country's
ability to provide an adequate interim custodial arrangement
for the child. This Comment will argue that while the Second
Circuit's clarified standard furthers the Convention's intention
of limiting the "grave risk" defense, it leaves sufficient room for
courts considering "grave risk" to deny the children's return if
extreme circumstances exist. This Comment will further argue
that when these extreme circumstances do not exist and courts
applying the clarified standard return the abducted children,
these courts must take additional steps to further the goal of
safeguarding the welfare of the children once they are re-
turned.
This Comment will analyze how the Second Circuit
reached its decision in Blondin II, and provided a new, more
clarified standard for examining the "grave risk" exception. It
will also analyze how the District Court applied this new stan-
dard on remand. Part II of this Comment will give a brief
background of the Hague Convention and the principles under-
lying its enactment. To put in context the defense raised by the
respondents and other defenses that may be raised under the
Convention, Part III of this Comment will focus on some of the
exceptions the Convention provides to allow abducted children
to remain in the country to which they were abducted. Part IV.
will center on the clarified standard and how it was applied by
the district court. This section will compare how courts in
foreign countries and in other U.S. Circuits have handled the
"grave risk" exception and decide where the Second Circuit's
standard stands in relation to them. This analysis will deter-
mine whether these different approaches further the goals of
20. Id. at 298.
21. Id.
22. See Brian L. Webb & Diana S. Friedman, Hague Convention on Interna-
tional Child Abduction, in NORTH AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION: HOW TO HANDLE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES 15 (1993).
726 [Vol. XXVI:2,
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the Convention.
Part V comes to the conclusion that the Second Circuit's
standard best implements the goals of the Convention. This
section will also look at other steps courts can take to further
the goals of the Convention. It will examine what measures
courts should develop or adopt from foreign jurisdictions in
order to assure that the children's safety and well being are
secured at all stages of the abduction dispute. This section will
also submit suggestions for streamlining the decision making
process involved in Hague Convention petitions. Further, it
will discuss alternate steps courts can take to make a more
swift analysis, and what references should be made available
to the court to aid in its decision making.
II. BACKGROUND - THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The Hague Convention was drafted in 1980 in order to
provide a remedy for international child abductions.23 After
becoming a signatory to the Hague Convention on July 1,
1988,24 the United States Congress enacted the domestic en-
abling legislation for the Convention entitled the "Internation-
al Child Abduction Remedies Act."25 In enacting this legisla-
tion, Congress recognized that the international abduction of
children is harmful to their well being,26 that persons should
not be allowed to obtain custody of children by virtue of such
23. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1. The stated objectives of
the Hague Convention are:
a. to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or
retained in any Contracting State.
b. to ensure the rights of custody and of access under the law of
one contracting state are effectively respected in other contracting
states.
24. The Contracting states are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bel-
gium, Belize, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Colom-
bia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germa-
ny, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxemburg, Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa,
Spain, St. Kitts and Nevis, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States,
Venezuela, Zimbabwe. Information obtained from the United States Central Au-
thority, The Office of Children's Issues. Id.
25. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C § 11601 (1988).
26. Id. at § 11601(a)(1).
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wrongful abduction,27 and that international abductions are
an increasing problem that "only concerted cooperation pursu-
ant to an international agreement can effectively combat."
21
Further, Congress recognized that the Hague Convention es-
tablished legal rights and procedures for the prompt return of
children and that the treaty framework would help to resolve
the problem of international abduction, and would help to
*deter it in the future.29
The Hague Convention authorizes an aggrieved parent to
apply for the prompt return of the child to the country from
which he or she was abducted." The Convention is unique
because it is not an extradition treaty and it creates only a
civil remedy.3' This means that the child abduction does not
create criminal penalties under the treaty, but instead creates
civil procedures to provide a civil remedy. 2 This however does
not preclude individual states from making child abduction a
criminal offense. The Convention was constructed in order to
compel the parent to return the child voluntarily, and it oper-
ates irrespective of the existence of custody decrees.33 Since
custody decrees are irrelevant,34 courts are expected to
promptly return an abducted child to his country of "habitual
residence" without addressing the merits of the underlying
parental claim. 5 By allowing the courts of the child's habitual
residence to decide the custody dispute, the Convention strives
to eliminate the incentive for parents to forum shop, or seek al-
ternative rulings under what may be the more favorable laws
of another country.36 By requiring courts to return the child
without considering the child's best interests, the Convention
seeks to prevent the court from making value judgements
27. Id. at § 11601(a)(2).
28. Id. at § 11601(a)(3).
29. Id. at § 11601(a)(4).
30. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, at Preamble.
31. See id. at art. 12. See also Peter H. Pfund, Hague International Child
Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494, 10505. (1986)
(hereinafter Legal Analysis).
32. Legal Analysis, supra note 31, at 10505.
33. Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 17.
34. See Legal Analysis, supra note 31, at 10504.
35. Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 19.
36. See Lynda H. Herring, Taking Away the Pawns: International Parental
Abduction & The Hague Convention, 20 N.C.J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 137, 140
(1994).
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BLONDIN V. DUBOIS
about the state and the culture from which the child had been
snatched.37 The aim is to restore the "factual status quo"
without any inquiry into the custody situation."8
For an aggrieved parent to seek the aid of the Hague Con-
vention, the countries from and to which the child has been
abducted must have implemented the Convention before the
wrongful removal or retention.39 Second, the child must have
habitually resided in the contracting state from which he was
abducted and have been wrongfully removed and retained."
However, once the child turns sixteen, the Convention ceases
to apply even if the abduction occurred prior to the child reach-
ing the age of sixteen.4 Further, if the aggrieved parent al-
lows more than a year to pass from the abduction to the com-
mencement of the legal proceedings, the court may deny the
return of the child if it appears that the return may further
disrupt the child's life.42 The varying interpretations of these
procedures are outside the scope of this Comment.
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION
Although the ultimate goal of the Convention was the
return of the child to the state from which he or she was
wrongfully removed, some exceptions were included in the
Convention to allow judges to refuse the return under certain
circumstances.43 These exceptions "reflect an attempt to bal-
37. E. Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report of the Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction, Acts and Documents of XlVth Session, Volume
III, 1982, 426 at 430-31, paras. 19, 22, 23. [hereinafter Perez-Vera Report]. Elisa
Perez-Vera was the official Hague Conference Reporter for the Convention, and her
explanatory report is recognized as the official history of and Commentary on the
Convention.
38. See Legal Analysis, supra note 31, at 10505.
39. Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 35.
40. Id. at arts. 3, 4. "The removal or the retention of a child is to be consid-
ered wrongful where (a) it is in breach of rights of custody . . . under the law of
the state in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the remov-
al or retention; and (b) at the time of the removal or retention those rights were
actually exercised . . . " Id. at art. 3.
41. Id. at art. 4.
42. Id. at art. 12. See also Legal Analysis, supra note 31, at 10509. "The
reason for the passage of time . . . is also relevant to the ultimate disposition of
the return petition. If the alleged wrongdoer concealed the child's whereabouts
from the custodian necessitating a long search for the child . . . it is highly ques-
tionable whether the respondent should be permitted to benefit from such conduct
absent strong countervailing considerations." Id.
43. Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 12. "The Authority concerned
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ance the wariness of the signatories to relinquish autonomy
against their commitment to deter parental child abductions on
an international level." Specifically, this Comment will focus
on the "Grave risk"45 and the "Fundamental Principals"4" ex-
ceptions.
A. The Grave Risk Exception
Under Article 13(b), a court in its discretion "need not
order a child returned if there is a grave risk that return
would expose the child to physical or emotional harm or other-
wise place the child in an intolerable situation."47 This excep-
tion was included to reach a compromise between varying legal
systems and is intended to be very narrowly construed to as-
sure that is not used as a method to litigate the child's best
interests or to determine custody.4" The exception recognizes
that in some cases the consequences of not allowing the foreign
jurisdiction to hear the case may be less harmful than ordering
the child's return.49 To prevent hearings on the child's best in-
terests "only evidence directly establishing the existence of a
grave risk that would expose the child to physical or emotional
SHALL order the return of the child forthwith." Id. (emphasis added). See also
Webb & Friedman, supra note 22. "Generally the return of a child pursuant to the
Hague Convention is mandatory; however, under certain circumstances the court
has some discretion in determining whether or not to return the child to the coun-
try of his or her habitual residence." Id. at 13.
44. Dana R. Rivers, The Hague International Child Abduction Convention and
the International Child Abduction Remedies Act: Closing Doors to the Parent Ab-
ductor, 2 Transnat'l Law. 589, 624 (1989). "In designing the exceptions, the Con-
vention drafters faced the difficult problem of how to serve the interests of the
individual child while promoting the broad policy interest of the treaty" . . . Their
solution serves the dual purpose of promoting the interests of any given child
while enabling the signatories to maintain a workable, effective compromise." Id.
45. Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 13.
46. Id. at art. 20.
47. Legal Analysis, supra note 31 at 10510. See also Webb & Friedman, supra
note 22, at 15. "The [grave risk] provision is somewhat analogout to the 'serious
and immediate question' exception to an automatic return of the child pursuant to
a writ of habeas corpus. The "grave risk" standard is, however, more stringent
and requires a higher burden of proof." Id.
48. Legal Analysis, supra note 31, at 10509.
49. See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 37 at 433 para. 29. "Thus, the interest
of the child in not being removed from its habitual residence without sufficient
guarantees of its stability in the new environment, gives way before the primary
interest of any person in not being exposed to physical or psychological danger of
being placed in an intolerable situation." Id.
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harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation is
material to the court's determination."" The deliberations
surrounding the use of the term "intolerable situation" display
that a person opposing a child's return must show that the risk
is grave, not merely serious. 1 The risk is considered "grave" if
it "exceed[s] the level of triviality and constitute(s) an 'intolera-
ble situation' that is of an extreme and compelling nature."52
Further, the party asserting the "grave risk" defense must
prove it by clear and convincing evidence.53 The fact that the
exceptions outlined in Article 12 and 13(a) need only be estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence, suggests that the
higher evidentiary standard demanded for the "grave risk"
exception was intended to limit the scope of its application.54
In determining whether a "grave risk" of harm exists,
courts have been aware that the threat of harm can be created
by the country from which the child has been abducted or by
the non-abducting parent.55 This country or parent distinction
is based on the fact that if the risk is posed by the non-abduc-
ting parent the court must be careful not to decide the ulti-
mate custody issues.56
The most narrow view of "grave risk" refers exclusively to
the risk posed by the country.57 Under this view, a "grave
risk" posed by a parent will not provide a defense to a Hague
Convention petition. An appreciation of a country as a possible
source of a "grave risk" begins with the recognition that the
Central Authority from that country filed the "application" for
the return of the child and the country, rather than the peti-
50. Id.
51. Id. An example of an "intolerable situation" is one in which a custodial
parent sexually abuses the child. If the other parent removes or retains the child
to safeguard it against further victimization, and the abusive parent then petitions
for the child's return under the Convention the court may deny the petition. Id.
52. Herring, supra note 36, at 168 (citing In re N, (1991) 21 Fam. L.R. 367,
368).
53. See 42 U.S.C. 11603(e)(2)(A) (setting forth standard of proof for defenses
pursuant to Articles 13(b) and 20).
54. See id. at 11603(e)(2)(B) (setting forth standards of proof for defenses pur-
suant to Articles 12 and 13).
55. See Webb and Friedman, supra note 22, at 16.
56. See Robert D. Arenstein, The Anatomy of the Hague Case When a Child
has been Abducted to the United States, in NORTH AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON IN-
TERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: HOW TO HANDLE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUC-
TION CASES 1 (1993).
57. See Gsponer v. Johnstone, (1988) 12 Fam. L.R. 755.
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tioning parent, is therefore, "the applicant."58 A respondent
parent will generally have difficulty mounting a "grave risk"
defense for there are few situations in which the child will be
considered in threat of danger posed by the requesting state."
For example, "a grave risk would be posed by the country if
the requesting country were at war on its own soil and there
was a likelihood that the child might be captured, injured or
killed."0 Unless falling within these few exceptions, "no evi-
dence will exist"6 ' that will prevent a child from being re-
turned to a country because of the harm it may cause.
When a respondent parent claims that the "grave risk" is
actually posed by the petitioning parent, they must meet the
higher evidentiary standard and prove that the risk is "sub-
stantial, not trivial."62 Generally, even if evidence of "grave
risk" exists, courts will be extremely reluctant to deny a peti-
tion for the return of the child, the proper assumption being
that the Court of the Habitual Residence of the children would
take the steps necessary to protect them. Since assessing the
risk posed by a parent is much like making a prohibited custo-
dy determination, the 13(b) exception was intended to be used
only in situations where there is a chance of substantial psy-
chological or physical harm.63
B. The Fundamental Principles Exception
Article 20 further limits the return obligations of Article
12. It states: "The return of the child under the provisions of
58. Webb and Friedman, supra note 22, at 16. Each Contracting state was
required to establish a Central Authority which had the broad mandate of assist-
ing applicants to secure the return of their children or the effective exercise of
their visitation rights. The Central Authority is expressly directed by Article 10 to
take all appropriate measures to obtain the voluntary return of the children. Legal
Analysis, supra note 31 at 10511. See also Hague Convention, supra note 2, at
arts. 1, 10, 21.
59. See Webb and Friedman, supra note 22, at 16.
60. Id. Another example where "grave risk" might exist is where a nuclear
disaster occurred in the country and the children would be exposed to large doses
of radiation upon their return home. Id.
61. Id.
62. Re C, 2 F.C.R. 507, 517 (C.A. 1999).
63. See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996). "There is a grave
risk of harm in cases of serious abuse or neglect, or extraordinary emotional de-
pendence, when the court in the country of habitual residence, for whatever reason
may be incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate protection." Id. at 1069.
732 [Vol. XXVI:2
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Article 12 may be refused if this would not be permitted by the
fundamental principles of the requested state relating to the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms."64 The
term "fundamental principles" does not refer to international
conventions or declarations concerned with the protection of
human rights, but instead is a reference to "the fundamental
provisions of the law of the requested state."" In other words,
"fundamental principles" refers to actual domestic laws of that
state, not to international notions of human rights. While the
drafters intended to limit article 13 exceptions to prevent
courts of one nation from making value judgements of another
nation, the "fundamental principles" exception is the result of a
compromise with those contracting states that believed another
exception was necessary to cover extreme situations outside
the scope of article 13.66 The clause was ultimately adopted
because it could only be invoked "on the rare occasion that
return of the child would utterly shock the conscience of the
court or offend all notions of due process." 7
In order to invoke the "fundamental principles" exception,
the respondent parent must demonstrate that the return of the
child would violate an actual domestic law of that state.68 It
will be necessary for the respondent party to "show that the
fundamental principles of the requested state concerning the
subject matter of the Convention do not permit"69 the return
of the child. The state will not be able to deny the return of the
child if the exception will simply violate a state policy or cus-
tom.0 Further, the respondent parent cannot show "merely
that (the child's) return would be incompatible, even manifest-
64. Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art 20.
65. A.E. Anton, The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, 30
INTVL & COMP. L.Q. 537, 551-552 (1981).
66. Id. See also Legal Analysis, supra note 31, at 10510.
67. Legal Analysis, supra note 31, at 10510. Although this language has no
known precedent in international law to aid in its interpretation, this exception,
like the others, was intended to be restrictively interpreted and applied. Id.
68. Perez-Vera Report, supra note 37, at 462, para. 118. This rule is con-
cerned only with the principles accepted by the law of the requested state, either
through general international law and treaty law, or through internal legislation.
Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. See also, Susan L. Barone, International Parental Child Abduction: A
Global Dilemma With Limited Relief-Can Something More be Done?, 8 N.Y. INT'L
L. REV. 95, 110 (1995).
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ly incompatible" with the laws of that state and instead must
show that the laws of the state simply do not permit it." The
Article 20 exception should not be used by a court simply be-
cause that state operates a system of preferred custody of one
parent over the other. 2
As an additional limitation, the framers made clear that a
country should not invoke the "fundamental principles" excep-
tion in applying the Convention any more frequently than it
applies public policy exceptions in purely internal matters. 3
These limitations were necessary as a compromise measure,
and enabled the exception to be adopted.74 Because of these
limitations, and the fact that the Article 20 exception must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence, 5 the "fundamental
principles" exception has been very difficult to apply.
76
IV. BLONDIN: A CLARIFIED STANDARD
A. Application of the Clarified Standard
In Blondin I, the district court allowed the children of
Blondin and Dubois to remain in the United States because it
determined that returning the children to France would put
them at "grave risk" of psychological harm or in an intolerable
situation.7 This decision was based largely on evidence that
showed that Mr. Blondin was abusive towards the mother and
children and the court's assessment that return of the children
to France, other than in Blondin's custody, was impractica-
ble." In determining the temporary state of custody for the
children pending the ultimate custody decision, the court con-
71. Perez-Vera Report, supra note 37, at 462, para. 118.
72. See Carol Daigle, Due Process Rights of Parents and Children in Interna-
tional Child Abductions: An Examination of the Hague Convention and its Excep-
tion, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 865, 878-79 (1993-94). See also Legal Analysis,
supra note 27, at 10510.
73. Perez-Vera Report, supra note 37 at 462, para. 118. Otherwise, this provi-
sion would be discriminatory in itself, and opposed to one of the most widely
recognized fundamental principles in internal laws. Id.
74. Legal Analysis, supra note 31, at 10510.
75. Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 20; 42 U.S.C at § 11603(e)(2)(A).
76. See Daigle, supra note 72, at 875. "Because the scope of public policy
provisions is difficult to define and policies vary among states, public policy provi-
sions are unusual in conventions involving private international law." Id.
77. See Blondin I, 19 F. Supp.2d at 127.
78. Id.
734 [Vol. XXVI:2
BLONDIN V. DUBOIS
cluded that Blondin would be financially unable to support the
children outside of his home.79 Further, in a ruling from the
bench, the court in Blondin I rejected Blondin's suggestion that
the children could stay with their godmother in France pend-
ing the final custody decision by the French Courts. ° The
Second Circuit made clear in Blondin II that "the District
Court did not offer any basis in the Convention or any other
legal authority for its determination that a temporary third
party placement would be unacceptable.""' Aside from reject-
ing the possibility of the children staying with their godmoth-
er, the district court did not explicitly consider any other alter-
native custodial arrangements and stated that "if I am going to
send the children back, I am probably going to do it with Mrs.
Dubois." 2 However, upon further consideration the court de-
termined that even sending the children back to France in the
custody of their mother would present a grave risk, stressing
that the family's financial circumstances would force Dubois to
live with Blondin. 3
On appeal the Court of Appeals embraced a new standard
which demands that all courts in the Second Circuit consider-
ing a Hague Convention petition do a more thorough analysis
of "the full panoply of arrangements that might allow the chil-
dren to be returned to the country from which they were ab-
ducted. " ' While the circuit court in Blondin II agreed with
the district court's decision that the children would be at
"grave risk" if returned to the custody of their father, it vacat-
ed the decision and remanded the case for a new trial based on
79. Id. at 128. Blondin represented to the court that "he had no more money"
and could not afford the cost even of airfare to come back to the United States.
Id. He further represented to the court that he had to take out a loan to come to
the United States in the first place. Id.
80. See Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 244.
81. Id. at 249.
82. Id. See also A Summary of Remarks by Richard Dyer on the Application
of the Hague Child Abduction Convention to Questions of Access, in NORTH AMERI-
CAN SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: How TO HANDLE INTERNA-
TIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES (Sept. 30, 1993). Some courts, where the financial
situation of the family would not allow the primary caretaker-who abducted the
child-to return with the child to her habitual residence, have required "undertak-
ings" on the part of the parent seeking return in order to allow the primary care-
taker to also return. Id at 2.
83. See Blondin I, 19 F. Supp. at 128.
84. Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 242.
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the clarified standard. 5 The court in Blondin 11 made it clear
that under this standard the courts of the child's habitual
residence would be given a greater opportunity to adjudicate
custody.86 The Court of Appeals hoped that this would effec-
tively honor the simultaneous Hague Convention commitments
of returning wrongfully abducted children to their homes for a
custody decision there, and safeguarding them from a "grave
risk" of harm.87 This standard allows courts the opportunity
to consider whether other options are available under the for-
eign law whereby the children could be placed in adequate
temporary care, pending resolution of the ultimate custody
decision.8 If the court is satisfied that the foreign country can
provide adequate care in the interim while the custody battle
is waged, then the court should return the child to that coun-
try despite the fact that a "grave risk" to that child exists at
the hands of one of the parents.8 9
On remand, the district court applied the clarified stan-
dard and considered whether there were remedies that would
protect the children pending a final adjudication of custody in
France." To develop a more thorough record, the court wrote
to the French Ministry of Justice and the United States De-
partment of State seeking their assistance.91 In response, the
French authorities detailed what social services and
protections awaited Dubois and the children should they be re-
turned to France.2 Also, the United States presented a
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. This further alignment with treaty goals, the court hoped, stood not
only to protect children abducted to the United States, but also to protect Ameri-
can children abducted to other nations, whose courts are expected to offer recipro-
cal protection. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 249. See also Linda Silberman, Hague International Child Abduction
Convention: A Progress Report, in NORTH AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL
CHILD ABDUCTION: HoW TO HANDLE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES (July
26, 1993). If the Convention is to be a success, the court must defer to the foreign
nation, "regardless of the conduct of the parties' and unless there is no satisfac-
tory alternative custody arrangement in the state of habitual residence." Id. at 53.
90. Blondin III, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 287.
91. Id. These are the two agencies that serve as the Central Authority "to
discharge the duties which are imposed by the Convention." See Hague Conven-
tion, supra note 2, at art. 6.
92. Blondin III, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
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French attorney and expert on French family law.93 From the
response of the French Ministry of Justice and the testimony of
the United State's expert, the court determined that if Dubois
and the children returned to France, Dubois would have to file
a request in French family court seeking a modification of the
prior French order which granted joint parental authority of
the children to Blondin and Dubois and established the
children's principal residence with Blondin. 4 Dubois would
need to seek a temporary custody order fixing the "habitual
residence" of the children with her pending the completion of
the new custody hearing." The testimony also indicated that
the French family judge would appoint a forensic expert (child
psychiatrist) and a welfare officer to evaluate the children and
prepare reports to the court.96 The expert estimated that "the
entire process of evaluating the children, preparing the reports,
conducting a hearing, and rendering a final custody decision
could take from one to three months, depending on the dili-
gence of Dubois's attorney, the speed of the forensic expert and
the welfare officer, and the willingness of both parties to par-
ticipate in the inquiry."97 A legal representative would be ap-
pointed to Dubois if she so requested."
The French Ministry of Justice and the United State's
expert also indicated that while waiting for the custody pro-
ceedings to complete Dubois would be eligible to receive social
services.99 Dubois would receive some money each month from
the government that would go towards their rent or she would
be able to apply for residence in a shelter.'0 Further, the Of-
fice of the Public Prosecutor of Bobigny stated that it would
not criminally prosecute Dubois for the abduction if she re-
turned with the children, but that it may seek to extradite her
from the United States to pursue a criminal prosecution in
France if she does not return.'
In further developing its record, the District Court also
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Blondin III, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 289.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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heard testimony from Dr. Solnit, a professor of pediatrics and
psychiatry, on the psychological impact of sending the children
back to France for the custody proceedings." 2 After inter-
viewing the mother and children and reviewing the court's
memorandum decision, Dr. Solnit came to the conclusion that
Marie-Eline "suffered from an acute, severe traumatic disorder,
caused by Blondin's physical and verbal abuse of her and her
mother and the problems of living in an abusive situation."1 3
While Dr. Solnit testified that Marie-Eline's brother had been
too young during the time of the abuse to have manifested a
traumatic stress disorder, the court made clear that it had no
intention of separating the children.0 4 Dr. Solnit further tes-
tified that, while the children had recovered significantly be-
cause of their current living arrangements in a safe home with
their extended family, they are "not fully recovered yet."105
Based on these findings, Dr. Solnit testified that any return to
France would "'almost certainly' trigger a post-traumatic stress
disorder" impairing their physical, emotional, intellectual, and
social development and leading to 'long term or even perma-
nent harm to their physical and psychological develop-
ment.""6 Dr. Solnit made clear that that the risk of post-
traumatic stress disorder would be present in any proposed ar-
rangement for returning the children to France "however care-
fully organized."' 7
Based on this evidence, and applying the clarified stan-
dard, the District Court held that returning the children to
France under any arrangement would put the children in a
"grave risk" of physical or psychological harm.0 8 First, the
court determined that even temporarily removing the children
from their present environment, where they have begun to
recover, would "thwart" their recovery causing their traumatic
102. Id at 290. Testimony was heard from Dr. Albert Solnit, Sterling Professor
Emeritus of Pediatrics and Psychiatry and Senior Research scientist at the Yale
University Child Study Center.
103. Id. at 290-291.
104. Blondin III, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 290-91. The court stated that "Children's
relationships with their siblings are the sort of 'intimate human relationships' that
are afforded a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by
the State." (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, (1984)).
105. Id. at 291.
106. Id. at 292.
107. Id. at 291.
108. Id. at 294
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stress disorder to reoccur."' 9 Second, the court held that the
children's trauma would be compounded by the uncertainties of
custody proceedings, and the possibility of becoming wards of
the state after other temporary living arrangements were no
longer available."0 Finally, the court concluded that Marie-
Eline was mature enough for the court to take into consider-
ation her objection to being returned to France."' Since no
arrangement that France could provide would alleviate a reoc-
currence of the traumatic stress disorder, the court held that a
"grave risk" of harm existed and denied Blondin's petition for
the return of the children to France.
112
B. The Clarified Standard v. Other Courts
i. The Domestic Front
In order for the Hague Convention to succeed in its goal of
promoting the return of children to their habitual residence,
there must be a uniform interpretation of the treaty that at
once promotes it goals and respects the values and sovereignty
of the other signatories."' While the opportunities for the
courts of other circuits to interpret the "grave risk" and "public
policy" exceptions have been relatively limited, the holding of
the Second Circuit seems to solidify procedures to which other
circuits alluded.
a. The Sixth Circuit Rule
In the Sixth Circuit case of Friedrich v. Friedrich,"4 the
court stressed a restrictive reading of the "grave risk" excep-
tion and ruled that "(I)f return to a country or to the custody of
a parent in that country is dangerous, we can expect that
country's courts to respond accordingly."" 5 While the court in
109. Id. at 295.
110. Blondin III, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 295-96. The court further noted the uncer-
tainty surrounding the fact that there was presently a French order in force, di-
recting that the children's principal residence was with Blondin. Id.
111. Id. at 296. The court made clear that it was "not relying exclusively or
extensively on Marie-Eline's views in deciding not to send the children back." Id.
112. Id. at 298.
113. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 403-404 (1985).
114. 78 F.3d 1060 (1996).
115. Id. at 1068.
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Friedrich did not demand that the courts in that Circuit take
an active role in determining what the petitioning country
could do to care for the children, it realized that, in most situa-
tions, the children should be returned, since the petitioning
country should be given the opportunity to respond.'16 The
holding of Blondin II is consistent with the Sixth Circuit's
belief that the foreign country can handle most situations, but
further allows the courts of the Second Circuit to take the
procedural steps of determining what custody arrangements
the foreign courts have available.
b. The Eighth Circuit Rule
The Eighth Circuit, in Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley"7
determined that if a 13(b) defense is raised the court must
undertake some evaluation of the people and circumstances
awaiting that child in his or her habitual residence.' Fur-
ther, the court specifically rejected the notion that a 13(b)
defense is viable only if "interim situations" that can be provid-
ed by the foreign court are unacceptable.' The Second Cir-
cuit followed the Eighth Circuit in mandating a further investi-
gation into the alternative circumstances that would be await-
ing the child if returned.2 ' Similarly, the specific holding of
Blondin 11 suggests that "grave risk" should be examined first,
and only when found to apply should the court determine the
ability of the child's home state to care for the children and
prevent the "grave risk."2' However, while the court in
Blondin 11 demanded an examination into a "grave risk" de-
fense as is required by the Eighth Circuit, its holding limits
the applicability of the defense if options exist in the foreign
country to protect against the "grave risk." Thus, while both
circuits favor an inquiry into the situations in the state of the
child's habitual residence, the Eighth Circuit requires an in-
vestigation to determine whether a "grave risk" argument is
valid while the Second Circuit requires the investigation as
116. Id. "We acknowledge that courts in the abducted from countries are as
ready as able as we are to protect the children." Id. at 1068-69.
117. 58 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 1995).
118. Id at 378.
119. Id. at 377.
120. See Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 242.
121. See id.
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part of a procedure to determine if the child can be adequately
protected in the foreign country even if the "grave risk" is
found to be present.
c. The New Jersey Rule
In Tahan v. Duquette,122 the Superior Court of New Jer-
sey supported the use of investigations to determine if the
foreign country can protect the child after a "grave risk" is
shown. In Tahan, the court ruled that "Article 13(b) requires
more than a cursory evaluation of the home jurisdiction's civil
stability and the availability there of a tribunal to hear the
custody complaint,"123 although extensive examinations into
psychological profiles and parental lifestyles would intrude into
the ultimate custody issue which should be left for the foreign
court.'24 The court further held that courts must be "empow-
ered to evaluate the surroundings to which the child is to be
sent" and any test which precludes focus on the people in-
volved in the care of the child is "narrow and mechanical."2
This holding supports the Second Circuit's movement towards
a procedural investigation of the surroundings to which the
child may be returned. Blondin II appreciates that the foreign
system provides a tribunal to hear the custody claim, but in
line with Tahan, realizes that courts in the petitioned state
must look further and make sure that the foreign system can
protect the child from "grave risk" in the interim until a final
custody decision is made. While the holding of Tahan advo-
cates a thorough but non-custody like investigation into the
surroundings to which the child would be returned in order to
determine if a "grave risk" is present, the court in Blondin II
advocates an investigation into the foreign system's ability to
protect the children even if a "grave risk" is proven. Thus,
while the court in Blondin II did not preclude the investigation
into psychological makeups and parental lifestyles in determin-
ing the existence of an article 13(b) defense, it is a furtherance
of the holding in Tahan for it clarifies the kind of investiga-
122. 613 A.2d 486 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
123. Id. at 489.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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tions courts should make into the foreign system if a 13(b)
defense is established.
d. The Third Circuit Rule
In Feder v. Evans-Feder, the Third Circuit offered sugges-
tions to bring U.S. courts more in line with the holdings of
foreign courts and further the goals of the Convention.126 In
this case the child's mother abducted him from Australia and
brought him to Pennsylvania. The district court did not exam-
ine the mother's 13(b) defenses for it found that the father
failed to make the threshold showing that their child was a
"habitual resident" of Australia as he would need to be in order
to invoke the Convention.'27 Thus, the district court denied
the father's application for the return of the child. On appeal,
the Third Circuit determined that the child was in fact a habit-
ual resident of Australia" and remanded the case to the dis-
trict court for a determination of whether the mother could
establish one of the 13(b) defenses to prevent the child's re-
turn.'29 In remanding the case, the Third Circuit made clear
that courts can put the burden on the petitioning parent to
complete certain "undertakings" to assure the court that the
child will be free of any "grave risk" pending the ultimate cus-
tody decision of the petitioning country's courts. 3 ' "Undertak-
ings" are steps or actions taken by the petitioning parent to
assure the court that the child would be protected from a
"grave risk" if returned to the country of their habitual
residence.' 3 ' The Court of Appeals instructed the district
court that even if a "grave risk" is proven, the court should
still investigate whether the "undertakings" provided by the
petitioning parent will prevent the child from suffering short
term harm.'32 Similar to the Second Circuit's holding, by de-
manding that the district court examine "undertakings" of the
126. 63 F.3rd 217 (3rd Cir. 1995).
127. Id. at 224.
128. Id. at 224.
129. Id. at 226.
130. Id.
131. See C. v. C., 2 All E.R. 465, 469-70 (C.A. 1989).
132. Feder, 63 F.3rd at 226. As in Blondin II, the Court of Appeals gave the
district court room to investigate and develop a thorough record that would aid in
its decision. It further stressed that time is still of the essence and that the court
should act expeditiously. Id.
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petitioning parent, the Third Circuit made a further suggestion
on how a court can assure that a child will be adequately pro-
tected in the foreign country if a "grave risk" is proven. This
guarantees that both goals of the Convention- the prompt re-
turn of the child to the country from which they were abduc-
ted, and the protection of the child, are satisfied.
ii. The International Front
a. England
The general attitude of English courts dealing with the
Hague Convention has been to implement its goal of returning
the children, relying on the belief that the welfare of the chil-
dren will be best served by the courts of their habitual resi-
dence who must decide the children's long term future.'33
In the case of Re C,"" the Court of Appeal overturned a
lower court decision which denied the return of abducted chil-
dren because of the existence of a grave risk of harm to the
children.135 The finding of "grave risk" was based on the ap-
prehension, tension and inevitable disruption which would
come from an unwelcome return to the child's habitual resi-
dence. 36 In rejecting this finding of a "grave risk," the Court
of Appeal said that the severity of the "grave risk" must be
measured by a higher standard and ruled that the mother who
abducted the children is "the author of her own misfortune"
and that the court must remember that the Convention was
designed to ensure that parties do not gain adventitious advan-
tage by taking the child to another jurisdiction and then
wrongfully retaining him or her.'37 Moreover, the Court of
Appeal acknowledged that the best interests of the children
may be to let them remain in England, but, in maintaining the
ideals of the Convention, held that Courts in England should
133. See Hague Convention, supra note 2.
134. 2 F.C.R. 507, 523 (C.A. 1999).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 513-14.
137. Id. at 520. See also C. v. C., 2 All E.R. 465 (C.A 1989). The refusal of
the mother to return with the child is the cause of the "grave risk" but the court
rejected this and determined that if the grave risk is to be inflicted by the abduc-
ting parent then "it would be relied upon by every mother of a young child who
removed him out of the jurisdiction and refused to return." Re C, 2 F.C.R. 507,
519.
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not engage in such a best interest speculation and that "the
purpose of the convention is to ensure that that decision is
taken by the courts where the children are habitually resi-
dent. 1
3 8
Similarly, in the case of K v. K, 139 the abducting mother
claimed that a "grave risk" would come from the child's separa-
tion from her as well as from alleged abuse at the hands of the
father.140 The court held that some psychological harm to the
child is inherent simply by implementing the Convention and
that the primary concern of the courts in the abducted to state
should be to provide the child with the maximum possible
protection until the courts of the other country can determine
the child's long term custody.14 ' Further, it was decided that
courts in England should assume that the courts in the other
country will minimize or eliminate the "grave risk" that is
posed to the child upon that child's return.4 1 In assuming
that the primary role for the courts in England was to protect
the child from "grave risk" until the country of habitual resi-
dence can step in, the court demanded that the petitioning fa-
ther offer undertakings to the courts of England to prove that
the mother and children would be protected until the foreign
court could make a custody decision.13 The father assured
the court that he would permit the mother and children the
exclusive occupation of a flat, that he would not enter that
building, that he would pay for the flat, and that he would not
initiate further criminal proceedings against the mother based
138. Re C, 2 FCR at 522-523. See also Re L, 2 F.C.R. 604 (Fam. 1999). Even
if ordering the return of the child does not serve this child's best interest "it
would be an order contributing in a very small way to the welfare of those nu-
merous other children . . . whose parents would be deterred from abducting them,
reabducting them and secreting them by a growing public awareness that what
would then happen would in all probability, be an order for return." Id. at 614.
139. 3 F.C.R. 207 (Fam. 1998).
140. Id.
141. Id at 212 (citing C. v. C., 2 All E.R. 465 (C.A. 1989)).
142. Id. The courts of England only should prevent the return of the child if
there is compelling evidence that the courts in the other country cannot protect
the child's welfare in the circumstances of this case. Id. See also Re M, 1 Faro.
L.R. 1021, 1026 (1995), (where it was determined that a "grave risk" preventing
the child from being returned would exist if it could be demonstrated that a re-
turn would result in the children actually being left homeless on the street with-
out recourse to state benefits).
143. K v. K, 3 F.C.R. at 214.
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upon the removal of the children.14 1 In demanding that the
petitioning parent make undertakings to it, this court dis-
played a genuine interest in the welfare of the children in the
interim before the foreign court could seize the matter and
resolve the issue, while at the same time honoring its treaty
commitment to return the abducted children. The court real-
ized that it could not enforce these undertakings in the foreign
court, but relied on them anyway as an additional safeguard to
the mother and child during "the only period with which this
court is concerned."45
As in K v. K, the Court of Appeal in Re M (Abduction:
Undertakings)14 ruled that undertakings promised by the
petitioning parent are designed to "make the return of the
child easier and to provide for the necessities, such as a roof
over the head, adequate maintenance, etc., until and only un-
til, the court of habitual residence can become seized of the
proceedings brought in that jurisdiction."'47 The court made
clear that these undertakings should not be used by the par-
ties to "clog or fetter" or "to delay the enforcement of a para-
mount decision to return the child." 8 While a return of the
children to the country of their habitual residence would be in
line with the goals of the Convention, the court realized that it
would also serve the best interests of all children for "it as-
sumes that in the absence of special circumstances, it will best
serve the immediate welfare of the abducted child to have its
long term interests judged in the land from which it was ab-
ducted."' Further, this court determined that requiring a
mother and children to live on state benefits until the court of
that country can decide the custody issues, would not create an
"intolerable situation" that should prevent the return of the
children. 5 ' This decision reflects the limited time frame for
144. Id.
145. Id. See also Re M, 1 Fam. L.R. 1021, 1027 (1995). Courts in the petition-
ing country should "assume that the courts and welfare services of the other coun-
try will all take the same serious view of a failure to honor undertakings given to
a court (of any jurisdiction)" Id. at 1027.
146. Re M, 1 Fam. L.R. 1021 (1995).
147. Id. at 1024-1025. See also C. v. C., 2 All E.R. at 470 (C.A. 1989) (listing
possible undertakings that a petitioning parent may take to secure the protection
of the child if returned).
148. Re M, 1 Fam. L.R. 1025 (1995).
149. Id. at 1027.
150. Id. at 1026-1027. The Court was satisfied that the petitioning state had a
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which the courts of England are active in protecting the child's
welfare when deciding a Hague Convention petition, and fur-
ther shows a very narrow interpretation of the "grave risk"
defense.
Despite the English court's narrow interpretation of "grave
risk", in Re M, 5' the court displayed a willingness to allow
the defense if it could not guarantee the welfare of the children
during the interim period for which it was concerned. In this
case the English mother had kept her children in England
after a visit, against the wishes of the father.152 The father
made a Hague Convention petition and was successful in se-
curing their return.'53 The mother was granted contact rights
which included visitation arrangements.'54 During the next
year the mother brought the children to see various psycholo-
gists whose findings supported the mother's custody of the
children. 5 ' The following year, while the children were vis-
iting in England and after having consulted with a third psy-
chologist, the mother retained the children beyond the time
she was allowed and made an application to the English courts
for custody. 6' The father made another petition under the
Hague Convention but this time was denied.5 7
Based on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeal held
that a "grave risk" existed and thus denied returning the chil-
dren. This decision was based significantly upon the fact that
the children had reached an age and degree of maturity where
the court could take into account their objections to being re-
turned to Greece.158 The court acknowledged that decisions
such as this are best made in the country of the children's
habitual residence, but it recognized that in the first Hague
Convention petition by the father the children had been re-
turned to his custody only to have their psychological problems
compounded.'59 The court realized that since no undertakings
developed policy of state benefits and that it is not for the court of the petitioned
country to suggest that such benefits would be inadequate. Id.
151. 2 F.C.R. 488 (C.A. 1998).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 491.
154. Id.
155. Id. One psychologist was Greek, the nationality of the father, and the
other was English. Id.
156. Id.
157. Re M, 2 F.C.R. 488 (C.A. 1998).
158. Id. at 497.
159. Id. at 498. The court believed that "the father and his family do not ac-
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were offered by the father, the children would likely be re-
turned to this unacceptable situation."' Having already hon-
ored the Convention to no avail, the court, during the second
Hague Convention petition, was convinced that in this excep-
tional case, the children should not be returned to their pater-
nal family. 6' Although this court denied the return of the
children based on the 13(b) defense, the circumstances of this
case make clear that this was truly an exceptional situation. In
recognizing the absence of offered undertakings by the father,
the court determined that there was no way the child could be
returned to their habitual residence, and be free from "grave
risk" in the interim. Thus, the court denied the second Hague
Convention petition.
Although the clarified standard of the Second Circuit is
consistent with England's application of the Convention, it
allows for a finding of "grave risk" in broader circumstances.
Similar to the holding of in Re C and K v. K, the Second
Circuit's clarified standard recognizes that courts hearing a
Convention petition should not examine the best interests of
the child and that the court should assume that the abducted
from county will minimize the "grave risk" that is posed.'62
However, as was shown in the district court's application of the
clarified standard on remand, courts in the Second Circuit may
find "grave risk" to be applicable in more situations than Eng-
lish courts. The court in Re M displayed a willingness to accept
the "grave risk" defense when the children's psychological
problems had been compounded by an initial return of the chil-
dren to their father.'63 However, the court only accepted this
defense on the second Convention petition after its initially re-
jection of the defense lead to the children being returned to
their father.' In applying the clarified standard, the district
cept that the children have any psychological problems. Consequently if the chil-
dren do go back they would not receive any help in the undoubtedly difficult peri-
od of adjustment." Id. at 496.
160. Id. at 496. The court made clear that no alternative arrangements besides
custody by the father had been suggested by the father leading the court to be-
lieve that it was the only option. Id.
161. Id at. 499. This holding was not a criticism of Greek courts, but was a
practical decision based on the facts of this case, that the children should not be
returned to the father. Id. at 498.
162. Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 248-249.
163. Re M, 2 F.C.R. at 496 (C.A. 1998).
164. Id.
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court accepted the "grave risk" defense because it was confi-
dent that any return of the children to France would compound
their psychological problems.16 Thus, under the exceptional
circumstances where any return of the abducted children
would cause extreme psychological harm, the clarified standard
allows for the acceptance of the "grave risk" defense, whereas
in England it appears that courts will only accept the "grave
risk" defense if there is evidence of extreme psychological harm
after an initial attempt to return the children failed.
Also, while the Second Circuit did not expressly authorize
the district court to examine the possibility of the petitioning
parent making undertakings to it, as did the courts in K v. K
and in Re M, the Second Circuit allowed the district courts to
consider the "range of remedies that might allow both the
return of the children to their home country and their protec-
tion from harm."166 Thus, under this clarified. standard courts
in the Second Circui can examine possible undertakings made
to it by the petitioning parent as the courts in England can.
b. Australia
Similar to the courts of England, the courts of Australia
have generally shut the door on the "grave risk" exception as a
viable defense to preventing the return of an abducted
child.'67 The court in Gsponer v. Johnstone set out the notion
that petitions for the child's return are in reality directed to
the other country, rather than the parent, and thus 13(b) ex-
aminations are confined to the "grave risk" posed by the coun-
try.6" The court further held that it should be assumed that
the country of habitual residence, if it is a signatory to the
Convention, is properly equipped to make suitable arrange-
ments for the child's welfare.'69 This holding puts a signifi-
cant limitation on the situations in a which a 13(b) defense
will be successful. If the "grave risk" can only be posed by a
165. Blondin III, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 294.
166. Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 249.
167. See Gsponer v. Johnstone, (1988) 21 Fam. L.R. 755.
168. See id. at 768. The court cites the preamble to the Convention for this
proposition: "prompt return of the child to the state of their habitual residence."
Id.
169. See id. This assumption is justified by Australia's entry into this Conven-
tion with other countries. Id.
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country, and since all signatory countries are assumed to be
able to effectively care for the welfare of their children, the
circumstances in the petitioning country will have to be truly
exceptional to have the Australian courts prevent a child's
return. 7 '
The Australian courts' disposition against having hearings
on the welfare of the child is further seen in Laing and The
Central Authority.' In this case the petitioning father had
very little association with the children and was accused of
sexual misconduct.172 Despite this, the court declared that "I
have a great deal of sympathy for the wife and the child, how-
ever, it must be remembered that I am not considering the
welfare of the child in the sense of making a determination as
to where the child should live."'73 The court further accepted
that some psychological harm would come from its order, but
hoped that a speedy decision by the courts in the petitioning
country would rectify it.' 74 The court recognized that it was
not returning the child to the care of the father but was in-
stead trusting the courts in the U.S. to provide an alternative
custody arrangement that would protect the child's best inter-
ests."'75 Thus, the Australian courts have clearly decided that
when they are the petitioned country and they are satisfied
that the courts in the petitioning country can adequately pro-
tect the child, they will return the child to the country of its
habitual residence, even if there is some evidence of physical
or psychological harm.
While the Second Circuit's clarified standard is restrictive
on the types of circumstances in which the "grave risk" defense
can be successful, it is vastly more liberal than the approach
taken by Australian courts. Even in situations .where psycho-
logical harm to the child is inevitable and there are allegations
of sexual misconduct, the Australian courts are unwilling to
170. See section III(A), supra (for a discussion of the risks that may be posed
by a country that would prevent a petitioned country from returning a child).
171. (1996) 21 Fam. L.R. 24.
172. Id. at 33, 42.
173. Id. at 42-43.
174. Id. at 43.
175. Id at 44. The court found it "inconceivable that the judicial system of the
State of Georgia in the U.S. would not be able to protect the children from any
significant risk of physical and/or psychological harm arising from the implementa-
tion of this court's order." Id.
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accept the "grave risk" defense, believing that the foreign coun-
try can handle the situation."' In contrast, while the Second
Circuit wanted courts to examine other arrangements signato-
ry countries could make to alleviate the "grave risk," it made
clear that "if the District Court remains unable to find any
reasonable means of repatriation that would not effectively
place the children in Blondin's immediate custody, it should
deny Blondin's petition under the convention."' Thus, while
Australian courts will return a child to a country even if a
"grave risk" is present, trusting the courts of that country to
handle the problem, the Second Circuit, rather than blindly
sending the abducted children back, allows courts to examine
whether the foreign nation can effectively alleviate the "grave
risk" and to deny the petition if they cannot.
C. The Clarified Standard and the Convention
In demanding that courts of the Second Circuit make this
further inquiry into the interim custody options available in
foreign countries, the Court of Appeals effectively placed an-
other hurdle in the path of parents who are seeking to main-
tain custody of the child they abducted to the United States.
Implementing this additional hurdle furthers the goals of the
Convention because the federal courts have the "discretion to
return a child, despite the existence of a defense, if return
would further the aims of the Convention."' 8 Thus, by nar-
rowing the practical applicability of the "grave risk" exception,
the Second Circuit furthered the Convention's goal of allowing
the courts in the state of the child's habitual residence to de-
termine custody. The question remains whether the other
stated goals of the Convention are better met by this new stan-
dard or the methods of the other circuits and nations.
Goal One: Preventing the Crossing of Borders in Search of
Sympathetic Courts
One of the main goals of the Convention is to deter people
from crossing international borders in search of a more sympa-
176. Id.
177. Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 250.
178. See Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1067.
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thetic court.'79 This intention is served by the clarified stan-
dard. If the decision in Blondin I was allowed to stand, it could
have had the precedential effect of encouraging mothers in
abusive marriages to abduct their children to New York, be-
cause the courts there are sympathetic to their situation. Real-
izing that this possibility would frustrate the goals of the Con-
vention, the court in Blondin II chose instead to further the
goals of the Convention and limit the application of the "grave
risk" defense. The court did this by demanding that a child be
returned, even if the abductor can prove that a "grave risk"
exists, if there are alternative custody opportunities in that
foreign country which may alleviate this "grave risk."'80 By
placing this additional demand upon those asserting the "grave
risk" defense, the Second Circuit furthered the goals of Con-
vention for its' holding acts to deter people from taking advan-
tage of a court that may be more sympathetic.
In the United States, only the Sixth Circuit may be more
effective in preventing the crossing of borders in search of
sympathetic ears.' In Friedrich v. Friedrich the Sixth Cir-
cuit made clear that it would return children even if a "grave
risk" was present absent an additional finding that the foreign
nation is unwilling or unable to give the child adequate protec-
tion.8 2 Because the Second Circuit mandated procedural
steps that courts must take in determining what, if any, custo-
dy arrangements the foreign nation has available, it may be
viewed as being slightly more sympathetic to the "grave risk"
defense than the Sixth Circuit. Moreover, since the district
court applied the clarified standard and still found a "grave
risk" to be present under the exceptional circumstances of
Blondin, the Second Circuit may be viewed as more sympa-
thetic to similar situations.
The courts of England and Australia have generally shown
little acceptance of the "grave risk" defense, except in the most
extreme of circumstances.'83 As compared to these nations
179. See Legal Analysis, supra note 31 at 10506. The Convention seeks to pre-
vent a later custody decision from being influenced by a change or circumstances
brought about by the unilateral action of one of the parties abducting the children
to a jurisdiction they hope will be more sympathetic to their custody claims. Id.
180. See Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 248-249.
181. See Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060.
182. Id. at 1069.
183. See supra Section IV(B)(ii).
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the Second Circuit appears more sympathetic, because it will
allow a "grave risk" defense to quash a petition if the court
determines that the foreign nation offers no arrangement that
will protect against the "grave risk."
Goal Two: Custody Decisions Should Take Place in the
Child's Habitual Residence
The holding in Blondin 11 also furthers the principle that
any debates on the merits of the custody question should take
place before the competent authorities in the state of the
child's habitual residence." 4 The Convention makes clear
that courts in the country to which the child has been abduc-
ted are not authorized to make determinations such as who is
the better parent. 85
The Court in Blondin II, taking heed of this demand, man-
dated that the district courts were to examine ameliorative
measures the foreign jurisdictions would take to alleviate the
risks that may be associated with the child's repatriation, but
were not to determine the underlying long-term custody deci-
sions that need to be made."8 6 By making clear the extent of
the district court's permissible examination of the foreign sys-
tem, the Second Circuit sought to promote a determination of
the merits of the abduction claim, but not the merits of the
underlying custody claim.'87 In applying the clarified stan-
dard the district court asserted that it was not "making a de-
termination as to the ultimate merits of the custody dispute"
but that it was "only determining the merits of the abduction
claim under the Convention.""8 8 Thus, since the clarified
standard encourages an examination of the possible temporary
custody arrangements pending the ultimate custody decision
but does not advocate hearings on the ultimate custody deci-
184. Perez-Vera Report, supra note 37 at 430, para. 19.
185. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 16. Article 16 puts con-
straints upon the courts in the abducted to country from determining custody
claims, and these constraints continue until the court determines that one of the
exceptions applies and the child is not to be returned, or it is clear that applica-
tion under the Convention will not arrive in reasonable time following receipt of
notice of the wrongful removal. See Legal Analysis, supra note 31, at 10509.
186. See 189 F.3d at 248-49.
187. Id. at 245.
188. Blondin III, 78 F. Supp. 2d 298-299.
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sion, it is consistent with the principles set forth by the Con-
vention.
While other courts in the United States allow similar in-
vestigations into the situations to which the abducted child
may return, none advocate deciding the ultimate merits of the
custody issue. While the court in Tahan v. Duquette advocated
some examination into the surroundings to which the child is
to be sent and the basic personal qualities of those located
there, it stressed that the inquiry "was not intended to deal
with issues or factual questions which are appropriate for
consideration in a plenary custody proceeding."'89  In
Friedrich v. Friedrich the Sixth Circuit recognized that "a
court in the abducted to nation has jurisdiction to decide the
merits of an abduction claim, but not the merits of the under-
lying custody dispute."9 ' Further, the Eighth Circuit in
Nunez-Escuerdo v. Tice-Menley held that while "the Article 13b
inquiry must encompass some evaluation of the people and
circumstances awaiting that child in the country of his habitu-
al residence" the court is "not to consider evidence relevant to
custody or the best interests of the child."'91 Also, English
courts recognize that the purpose of the Convention is to en-
sure that the best interest and custody decisions are made by
the courts where the child is habitually resident.'92 Similarly,
in Australia, the court in Laing and the Central Authority held
that "the very purpose of the Convention is to respect the cus-
tody orders of the jurisdiction of the country from which the
child was abducted." 9' Thus, the Second Circuit and other
courts who have dealt with the Convention, promoted the
Convention's intention of not allowing hearings on the ultimate
custody issue.
Goal Three: Expeditious Proceedings
A further goal of the Convention is to have the judicial and
administrative authorities "act expeditiously in proceed-
189. 613 A.2d at 489.
190. 78 F.3d at 1063.
191. 58 F.3d at 378.
192. Re C, 2 F.C.R. at 522-23 (1999).
193. (1996) 21 Fam. L.R. at 46.
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ings"194 in order to ensure a prompt return of the child. The
Convention stresses the necessity for speed in determinations
regarding children in the realization that the "procedural and
substantive decision-making should not exceed the time that
the child to be placed can endure loss and uncertainty.""'
The demand for a speedy hearing was further stressed by the
drafters when they gave the petitioning party and the Central
Authorities from the petitioning state the right to demand
statements from the court considering the petition explaining
the reasons for the delay if the hearing should take more than
6 weeks from the date of the proceeding's commencement. 9 '
The Court in Blondin 11 authorized the district court to
exercise its broad equitable discretion and develop a thorough
record to facilitate its decision and to make all appropriate
inquiries of the government of France in doing so. 9' With
these additional investigatory demands, and taking into con-
sideration the Article 13 demands of the Convention which
require the court to investigate the social background of the
child, '9 it would seem as though a court would be strained to
reach a just decision while acting expeditiously in the interest
of the child. Thus, courts in the Second Circuit may need to
take further steps to help streamline the application of the
clarified standard. Courts applying the holdings of Nunez-
Escuerdo v. Tice Menley and Tahan v. Duquette may have
similar difficulties in expediting the proceedings for they too
require the court to make some examination into the situations
awaiting the child should they be returned to the country of
194. Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art.11.
195. See Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 244 (citing Joseph Goldstein et al., THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 42-43 (1996) (the authors explain that "[A] child may
experience a given time period not according to its actual duration, measured
objectively by calendar and clock, but according to her subjective feelings of impa-
tience, frustration and loss."). Id.
196. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 11. See also, Linda K.
Girdner & Janet R. Johnson, A Judge's Guide to Risk Factors for Family Abduc-
tion and Child Recovery, 22nd National Conference on Juvenile Justice National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges and the National District Attorney's
Association (March 20, 1995). 'If the application of the Hague Convention has not
led to prompt return in other cases the seeming advantage of the Convention may
be lost, which presents an additional obstacle." Id. at 10
197. See Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 249. The court further instructed that the aid
of the United States Department of State should be sought in order to more effec-
tively communicate with the foreign government. Id.
198. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 13.
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habitual residence. 99
The Sixth Circuit in Friedrich realized that "any unneces-
sary delay renders the subsequent return more difficult for the
child, and subsequent adjudication more difficult for the for-
eign court." 0 While the holdings of the Second Circuit and
the Sixth Circuit are similar, unlike the Second Circuit, the
Sixth Circuit did not mandate that its courts investigate the
"full panoply" of alternative arrangements the foreign country
can offer.2' Thus, courts in the Sixth Circuit may be able to
conduct more expeditious proceedings than the courts in the
Second Circuit who must have more extensive proceedings.
Further, in England, in Re M, the court held that when dealing
with the Convention "speed is of the essence"2 and in the
Australian case of Laing and the Central Authority the court
recognized that the framework of the Convention was estab-
lished as such to ensure the "prompt return" of children to the
state of their habitual residence.0 3 Since these courts ex-
pressed a willingness to rely on the other signatories to protect
a child from any "grave risks," it is clear that the proceedings
there will be more swift than proceedings in the Second Circuit
where all possible arrangements the foreign country can pro-
vide must be examined.
V. ENFORCING THE CONVENTION: THE BLONDIN II CLARIFIED
STANDARD
A. True to the Convention, Best for the Children
Of all the jurisdictions that interpreted the "grave risk"
exception, the Second Circuit's standard is the most balanced
approach to achieving the goals of the Convention. First, by
restricting the applicability of the "grave risk" defense, the
Second Circuit recognized the need to honor our treaty commit-
ments and return abducted children in most situations. Sec-
199. 58 F.3d 374; 613 A.2d 486.
200. 78 F.3d at 1063.
201. See Blondin II, 189 F.3d 240; and Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1063.
202. Re M, 1 Farn. L.R. at 1024 (1995).
203. (1996) 21 Fain. L.R. at 45.
20001 755
BROOK. J. INTL L.
ond, the Second Circuit safeguarded the ultimate welfare of all
the children by appreciating that most will be greatly benefit-
ted if they can be safely returned to their familiar habitual
residence."4 On remand the district court stated that the
new clarified standard narrowed the "grave risk" exception "to
the point where it is virtually written out of the
Convention."0 5 However, even after applying the clarified
standard, the district court found enough room to hold that a
"grave risk" existed in the circumstances of Blondin."6 The
district court's decision displays that the clarified standard
protects the children and is not overly narrow, for it condones
the denial of a petition when the petitioning country cannot
adequately safeguard the welfare of the children. However,
while the Second Circuit's clarified standard will likely return
more abducted children, all jurisdictions, including the Second
Circuit, need to take additional steps to expedite the "grave
risk" determinations and safeguard the welfare of those re-
turned children while they are waiting for the outcome of the
custody proceedings.
B. Safeguarding the Children
While the children in Blondin were ultimately allowed to
stay in the U.S. because of the applicability of the "grave risk"
defense, it is clear that in many situations and in most juris-
dictions the children will be compelled to return to the country
of their habitual residence. Thus, courts in all jurisdictions
need to take additional steps to assure that the children will
be safe even after they are returned. This need has become
more evident as the number of abductions by the primary care-
giver (usually the mother) rises.0 7 Beaumont and McEleavy
submit that a different standard should not be applied to ab-
ductions effectuated by the primary care-giver and they sug-
gest that if courts in the abducted to nation are given the re-
204. See Blondin II, 189 F.3d at 242.
205. Blondin III, 78 F. Supp. At 298.
206. Id.
207. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 1, at 262. While the summary
return of a child to a situation that may be harmful is disturbing, it has been
made clear that the Convention seeks to protect the interests of children collective-
ly and that the welfare of the individual child is not the first and paramount
concern. Id. at 29.
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sponsibility to determine the child's future "the Hague Conven-
tion could not continue to exist in its present form.""' To
support the notion that children abducted by their primary
care-giver should in most cases be returned to their habitual
residence, Beaumont and McEleavy suggest that "there is no
conclusive evidence either way that the return of children re-
moved or retained by primary caregivers actually results in
harm," and that there is a high likelihood that the child will
have strong ties with the parent and/or community left be-
hind.0 9 Thus, if the "typical" abduction scenario increasingly
features the primary care-giver as the abductor and the Con-
vention is still strictly interpreted as to demand the child's
summary return, courts in all jurisdictions must make addi-
tional efforts to assure that the child's well being is safeguard-
ed if they are returned to their habitual residence unaccompa-
nied by the primary care-giver.
i. Demand that the Petitioning Parent Make Undertakings to
the Petitioned Court.
If a court decides to order the return of the child even
after conducting hearings on the 13(b) defense, the court may
still consider safeguarding the children from harm after their
return.210 Other courts in the United States should consider
the approach taken by the Third Circuit in Feder v. Evans-
Feder where the court demanded undertakings of the petition-
ing parent in order to safeguard the children when returned to
the country.' By demanding that the petitioning parent
make certain undertakings, the courts would also be consistent
with the holdings of foreign courts, as displayed in the English
208. Id. at 262.
209. Id. at 262-63. See also William M. Hilton, Dreaming the Impossible Dream:
Responding to a Petition Under the Convention on the Civil Aspects of Internation-
al Child Abduction, in THE NORTH AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION: HOW TO HANDLE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES (July 1,
1993). "Children of all ages develop their own culture which, while it does include
their family, is unique to their physical location. As a result the removal of the
child from their personal environment is . . . severely detrimental to them." Id. at
1.
210. See Danny J. Boggs, Defenses to Return in a Hague Case: A View from the
Bench, in THE NORTH AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION:
HOW TO HANDLE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES (July 1, 1993).
211. 63 F.3d 217, 226.
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case of K v. K.212 In situations similar to Blondin, where the
petitioning parent faced serious allegations of child abuse, the
court should condition return of the child on the petitioning
parent making undertakings. Such undertakings may include
providing a separate living arrangement and access to money
and food essentials, in order to allow the children to return in
the company of the abducting parent/primary care-giver.213 In
this way the court in the abducted to country is fulfilling its
duty under the Convention in safeguarding the children for the
time period with which it is concerned-from abduction until
the foreign courts take over-while honoring its duty to return
the children. Although it has been argued that demanding
undertakings is an attempt to exercise extra-judicial jurisdic-
tion or is an adjudication on custody, this argument fails, for in
requiring undertakings the court in the abducted to state is
only seeking to protect the short term safety of the child until
the court in the child's habitual residence is seized of the mat-
ter.214 Thus, the court imposing the undertakings is not in-
fringing upon the authority of the courts in the child's habitual
residence.
In determining the appropriate undertakings to allow the
child to return with their primary care-giver, the courts should
keep the burden upon the petitioning parent manageable and
should only demand that they provide the "bare minimum
necessary for avoiding serious risk of harm to the child."215 In
some cases, such as in Blondin, the petitioning parent may not
be able to make any financial guarantees that would provide
an alternative living arrangement for the children and primary
care-giver once they return. Only in special circumstances such
as this should the court be willing to separate the children
from their primary care-giver and consider allowing the wel-
fare system of the foreign country to safeguard the children in
the interim or, in the alternative, deny the petition and allow
the children to remain with their primary care-giver. If a court
is not convinced that the petitioning parent or the country of
212. 3 F.C.R. 207 (1998).
213. See Webb & Friedman, supra note 22 at 18.
214. BEAUMONT AND MCELEAVY, supra note 1, at 161.
215. Summary of Remarks by Adair Dyer on the Application of the Hague
Child Abduction Convention to Questions of Access (visitation) in NORTH AMERI-
CAN SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: How To HANDLE INTERNA-
TIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES (Sept. 30, 1993).
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the child's habitual residence will take immediate actions to
assure the child's safety upon their return, the court should
exercise its discretion and not return the child.
ii. Safe Harbor Orders
One of the main arguments against the imposition of un-
dertakings is that their enforcement has depended largely on
the goodwill of the petitioner making the promise, and thus
will usually leave the children and the abducting parent in a
vulnerable position.216 In order to guarantee that the under-
takings will be enforced, some courts have required that peti-
tioners promising undertakings to it also make mirror orders
with a court in the child's habitual residence.217 As was seen
in C v. C, English courts recognize these "safe harbor orders"
as a means to strengthen the promises upon which undertak-
ings are based."8 If forced to become involved in the dispute
before the child is even returned, the courts in the child's ha-
bitual residence will have a more active role in ensuring the
child's well being and the court will likely be more expedient in
determining the ultimate custody issues. While it appears that
U.S. courts are willing to accept "safe harbor orders" when one
of its citizens is the petitioner to a foreign jurisdiction,219
when petitioned, U.S. courts should demand that the petitioner
receive "safe harbor orders" from the courts in the child's ha-
bitual residence in order to ensure that the undertakings will
be enforced. Thus, in order to fulfill the Convention goal of
returning the child, with the child's safety as the ultimate
prerogative, the petitioning parent who can afford to make
undertakings, should make them to courts in both jurisdic-
tions.
iii. Streamlined Procedures
It is clear that the Convention encourages the petitioned
court to act swiftly in order to effectuate a prompt return of
the abducted child. However, despite the intentions of the
drafters, abduction cases often take a significant amount of
216. See BEAUMONT AND MCELEAVY, supra note 1, at 170.
217. See id. at 167, 265.
218. 2 All E.R. 465, 469 (1989).
219. See BEAUMONT AND MCELEAVY, supra note 1, at 167.
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time to be decided. For example, Feder v. Evans-Feder took
eight months to be decided and because of two separate ap-
peals in Friedrich v. Friedrich it took four and a half years for
the child to be ultimately returned to Germany.220 Thus, the
following suggestions are submitted as a means to further
hasten the decision making process to ensure that the children
are placed into a stable environment as soon as is possible.
a. Examine the "Interim Situation" in Conjunction With
Consideration of the "Grave Risk" Defense
Article 2 of the Convention makes clear that courts should
make every effort to have a hearing as soon as possible in
order to quickly effectuate the outcome of that hearing.
221
However, if the court attempts to conduct extensive hearings
regarding possible psychological harm to the children, the
quickened proceeding envisioned by the drafters will be under-
cut.2 2 To avoid a protracted hearing such as this, while still
protecting the safety of the children, Silberman suggested that
the courts "focus less on the substance of the allegations of
harm, but rather whether 'interim arrangements' as part of the
return can eliminate any serious threat."223
Courts confronted with a "grave risk" defense and alle-
gations of abuse at the hands of the petitioning parent should
immediately contact the Central Authority of the foreign na-
tion and the U.S. State Department to receive guidance on the
"interim arrangements" the foreign country can provide. While
waiting for this response, the court can continue with the pro-
ceedings and hear whatever crucial psychological or other
evidence is needed. Then, as the details regarding the interim
arrangements become available, the court will be in a more
informed position to decide whether those arrangements can
sufficiently eliminate the "grave risk." In this way the court
220. See id. at 254.
221. See Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 2. See also Girdner and John-
son, supra note 196, at 10 "[If the application of the Hague Convention has not
led to prompt returns in other cases the seeming advantage of the Convention
may be lost.").
222. See Silberman, supra note 89, at 95. See also BEAUMONT AND MCELEAVY
supra note 207, at 140-41. While article 13(b) should not be dealt with in an over-
iy cursory manner, the proceedings should not become immersed in a detailed
factual argument. Id.
223. Silberman, supra note 89, at 95.
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can determine whether a "grave risk" exists in the context of
the "interim arrangements" that may be able to alleviate the
risk. Silberman suggested that the court should first investi-
gate the nature of the "interim arrangements" and only after
deciding that these arrangements will not serve to protect the
children should the courts delve into a detailed examination of
the "grave risk."224 However, the problem with this approach
is that without an understanding of what the "grave risk" is, a
court will not be able to decide whether the "interim arrange-
ments" are capable of alleviating that risk. The district court
in Blondin would not have been able to accurately assess the
sufficiency of the "interim arrangements" if it had not
conjunctively determined the nature of the children's psycho-
logical trauma. If courts interpret the "interim arrangements"
in conjunction with the "grave risk" defense they may be able
to save precious time in the child's life and avoid further as-
similation of the child into a foreign environment which could
then lead to subsequent separation difficulties.
b. Develop References of "Interim Arrangements"
While diligent research can shed light on the custodial
arrangements available in foreign countries, "simple and expe-
ditious procedures should be available to ensure that decisions
are reached very quickly."225 The Convention demands that
all Central Authorities "provide information of a general char-
acter as to the law of their state in connection with the appli-
cation of the Convention."226 Thus, signatory countries should
provide a detailed synopsis on the types of custodial arrange-
ments that it can provide. By having a treatise on hand, the
court- can quickly and accurately weigh the options it has in
determining whether, under the circumstances of the case, the
petitioning country can alleviate the "grave risk."227 Having
224. Id. at 95-96.
225. EMERGENCY MEASURE IN FAMIILY MATTERS, RECOMMENDATION NO. R (91) 9
ADOPTED BY THE COMMIEE OF MINISTERS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ON SEPT.
9, 1999 at 6. Suggested measures include "using all modem communications tech-
nology to facilitate the introduction and conduct of any proceedings, the transmis-
sion of requests and exchanges of information between the courts and other com-
petent authorities and the different parties to the proceeding." Id.
226. Hague Convention, supra note 2, at art. 7(e).
227. See Herring, supra note 36, at 172-73. "It is imperative that both judiciary
and family law practitioners become familiar with this 'particularized litigation'
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readily available an explanation of the custodial arrangements
a country can provide does not allow the trial judge to pass
judgment on the arrangements, but instead allows the court to
play an active and informed role in protecting the children,
while respecting the law of the foreign nations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts making decisions in abduction cases often face the
difficulties of being bound by the treaty obligation to return
the child while hearing testimony regarding abuse that the
child suffered at the hands of the petitioning parent. In
Blondin II the Second Circuit clarified the standard for review-
ing the "grave risk" defense which has been thoroughly imple-
mented by foreign jurisdictions, but only alluded to in other
circuits of the U.S. This holding may serve as a catalyst to
encourage other Circuits to develop procedures that will enable
the courts to honor our treaty obligations while at the same
time assuring that a child caught in an unfavorable situation
such as this is adequately safeguarded. In light of the fact that
children are increasingly being abducted by their primary care-
givers in an attempt to avoid abusive situations, additional
steps must be taken by courts in all circuits to assure that the
children's safety is a top priority. It is clear that this can be
done within the confines of our treaty obligations if courts not
only inquire into the situations that await a returning child,
but go a step further and help to create a stable, safe environ-
ments for the child. Courts can do this by demanding that the
petitioning parent make undertakings to it as well as to the
courts in the child's habitual residence. By making these addi-
tional efforts, in many situations the petitioned court will en-
able a child to be returned with their primary care-giver thus
minimizing the disruption to the child's life. Moreover, it must
be remembered that even under the clarified analysis demand-
and exhibit a firm grasp on the 'intricacies of the convention'." Id. See also, Hon.
James D. Garbolino, The Cause of Action for Return Under the Hague Convention
When a Child is Abducted to the United States: A View from the Bench, in NORTH
AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: HOW TO HANDLE
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION CASES (where it is suggested that select judges
familiar with the convention be assigned these particular cases). See also, BEAU-
MONT AND MCELEAVY, supra note 1, at 168 (where additional methods of judicial
cooperation, including conference calls between judges of the two nations, are sug-
gested).
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ed by the Second Circuit, if a court is not convinced that the
child's safety will be adequately ensured it maintains the dis-
cretion to not return the child. Thus, while the holding of
Blondin 11 minimizes the uses of the "grave risk" defense, it
authorizes courts in the Second Circuit to make a more thor-
ough analysis of the methods by which a country will protect
the child. Through this more careful analysis and by taking an
increased involvement in the creation of a safe environment for
the children, courts can protect the children while in most
cases assuring their return.
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